This fourth volume traces the history of Renaissance philosophy and seventeenth century rationalism, covering Descartes and the birth of modern philosophy.

* Presents a broad survey of philosophical thought * Each chapter explores, and places in context, a major area of philosophical enquiry - including the theory of meaning and of truth, the theory of knowledge, the philosophies of mathematics, science and metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, aesthetics, and religion * Annotated bibliographies for each chapter and indexes of names and subjects * Glossary of commonly-used philosophical terms * Chronological table of the history of philosophy from 1600 (...) `It is a fine achievement and deserves the warmest praise ... Anyone interested in learning what contemporary philosophical debate is about will find this book invaluable ... for a book of this size and quality of content the cover price is modest. Every public library as well as every university, college and school library should have a copy on its shelves.' - Times Higher Education Supplement `A stimulating collection.' - Reference Reviews. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz betrifft Leibniz' Gedanken über Metaphysik in der Zeit von Dezember 1675 bis Dezember 1676, d. h. von den letzten Monaten seines Parisaufenthaltcs bis zum Beginn seines Aufenthaltes in Hannover. In dieser Zeit entwarf Leibniz Pläne für eine Abhandlung über Gott und die Welt und erwog die Möglichkeit, dieser Abhandlung eine deduktive Form zu geben. Der vorliegende Aufsatz entwickit und erläutert eine vermutete deduktive Version ¿ es metaphysischen Systems, die in den verstreuten Schriften dieser Periode entdeckt werden kann. Es (...) zeigt sieht, daß viel von Leibniz' reifer Philosophie bereits in diesem System enthalten ist. Jedoch findet sich kein Hinweis auf den dynamischen Charakter der Substanz und keine klare Formulierung der These, daß jeder Substanz ein vollständiger Begriff zukommt. Man findet vielleicht einige Andeutungen der späteren These, aber diese sind eher als Vorausdeutungen auf Leibniz' spätere Philosophie zu verstehen denn als konstitutive Teile des Systems von 1675/76. (shrink)

The papers in this volume, first published in 1982, deal with a number of different aspects of Marx's ideas and the varying constructions put on them by later Marxists. Based on a lecture series, they examine Marxist views of the nature of philosophy, of history and historical explanation, the role and importance of politics, and of literature and the place of ethics. Among the Marxists considered are Lukacs, Sartre, Habermas, Althusser and Macherey. A continuous concern through the volume is the (...) relation within Marxist thought of fact and value, with the implications that will have for our actions. (shrink)

At first sight, the philosophy of Spinoza may seem wholly alien to what is now generally regarded as philosophy in the English-speaking world. For some decades, the dominant trend in that philosophy has been linguistic and anti-metaphysical; the philosopher is held to be concerned with the analysis of language, and not with speculative system-building. Spinoza, on the other hand, is very much a system-builder; as to the analysis of language, he says explicitly that this is of no interest to him. (...) ‘It is not my intention’, he says, ‘to explain the meanings of words; it is my intention to explain the nature of things’. However, the paper which follows will attempt to show that Spinoza’s philosophy is not wholly without relevance today. It will try to do this by placing one of Spinoza’s most important doctrines, his theory of human freedom, within the context of recent discussions. (shrink)

The theme of this paper is a philosophical theory of communication; more specifically, a theory about the understanding of language. It is an old theory, whose classical exponent was John Locke, and in the form that Locke expounded it the theory is now generally rejected by philosophers. But it is far from being a mere museum piece. The view about language that Locke put forward was a plausible one, and it has continued to be put forward in various forms. My (...) main concern here is with a very recent version of the theory, contained in a book published early in 1975; however, it will be helpful to begin with a brief account of Locke's version. This is not only classical, but is also simple and clear, and as such it may serve as a useful stepping-stone towards an understanding of the more modern version. (shrink)

This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument (...) of the Ethics is conducted on the level of the ?second kind of knowledge?, reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers—one may mention in particular Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams—have drawn attention to the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck, as distinct from luck in an unqualified sense, has a bearing on the way in which people’s attributes and acts are assessed morally. More specifically, it has a bearing on the way in which people are praised or blamed, rewarded or punished. The issue involved is usually stated in terms of blame or punishment, though it could also be stated (...) in terms of praise and reward; luck can be good as well as bad. For convenience, I will concentrate on blame and punishment. It seems evident that a person cannot justly be punished or blamed for what is outside his control; it also seems evident that to call something a matter of luck is to say that it is outside the control of the person involved. Yet there are many cases of moral luck; that is, cases in which luck plays an important part in the acts or characteristics for which a person is blamed or punished. Nagel distinguishes four types of such luck. There is constitutive luck, where this relates to “the kind of person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities and temperament.” There is luck in the way in which a person is determined by antecedent circumstances, which make a man the kind of person he is. There is luck in one’s circumstances, i.e., the kinds of problems and situations one faces. Finally, there is luck in the way one’s actions turn out: for example, a motorist may have done all that is normally necessary to stop his car, but due to faulty brakes runs over a child. (shrink)

Leibniz, Determinist, Theist, Idealist by Robert Merrihew Adams, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. xi + 433. £45.00. ISBN 0?19?508460?8.

Early paper on the nature of the a priori in Kant and its relationship to modality.

The idea that cybernetics can throw light on problems connected with thinking and learning is now a familiar one. Psychologists who are concerned with these problems often make use of cybernetic analogies, and some cyberneticians claim that their science provides an answer to philosophical problems about the nature of thought. On this last topic a great deal has been written recently; but it is comparatively seldom that it is suggested that cybernetics can be applied to problems of aesthetics. On the (...) face of it, the mere idea of such an application might well seem absurd. Cybernetics, it will be said, is by definition the study of certain types of machines, and what light can possibly be thrown by such a study on questions which concern the nature of art? But even the strangest-sounding questions can prove enlightening, and in a recent broadcast talk Dr. F. H.George thought it worth while to ask whether a machine could create a work of art. This paper isdevoted to the development, and criticism, of some of the points which he made. (shrink)

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The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Don Garrett (ed.). Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xiii, 465. ISBN 0-521-39235-7 (hb); ISBN 0-521-39865-7 (pb). 40.00 (hb) 12.95 (pb). Spinoza: The Enduring Questions. Graeme Hunter (ed.). University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. xviii, 182. ISBN 0-8020-2876-4. 45.00. The Spinozistic Heresy: The Debate on the 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus'. 1670-77. Paolo Cristofolini (ed.). APA-Holland University Press: Amsterdam and Maarssen, 1995, pp. viii, 260. ISBN 90-302-1502-X. Disguised and Overt Spinozism around 1700. Wiep van Bunge and Wim Klever (eds.). (...) Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. ix, 378. ISBN 90-04-10307-4. Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's 'Ethics', by Genevieve Lloyd. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994, pp. 182. ISBN 0-8014-2999-4. 24.95. Spinoza and the 'Ethics', by Genevieve Lloyd. Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks, London, 1996, pp. x, 163. ISBN 0-415-10782-2 (pb). 6.99. Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom, by Herman de Dijn. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1996, pp. xii, 291. ISBN 1-55753-081-5. (shrink)

First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.